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Abstract
We reexamine some of the classic problems connected with the use
of cardinal utility functions in decision theory, and discuss Patrick Sup-
pes’ contributions to this field in light of a reinterpretation we propose
for these problems. We analytically decompose the doctrine of ordinal-
ism, which only accepts ordinal utility functions, and distinguish be-
tween several doctrines of cardinalism, depending on what components
of ordinalism they specifically reject. We identify Suppes’ doctrine with
the major deviation from ordinalism that conceives of utility functions
as representing preference differences, while being nonetheless empir-
ically related to choices. We highlight the originality, promises and
limits of this choice-based cardinalism.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the connection of choice data with cardinal utility
functions. By the standards of today’s microeconomics, the latter cannot
⇤The authors are grateful to the editors of the Journal of Economic Methodology for
inviting this paper, and the second author thanks them for allowing him to pay a personal
tribute to Patrick Suppes’ leadership and inspiration. The paper was completed when this
author was visiting Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin. The authors have greatly benefited from
a continuous dialogue with Ivan Moscati, as well from Mikaël Cozic’s insightful comments.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2711256 
rightfully represent the former. From the ordinal revolution of the first half
of the 20th century onwards, and despite the turn taken later by von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern, neoclassical economists have been reluctant to allow
cardinal utility into economic theory. This reluctance is inseparable from the
view, which spread out among them concurrently, that choices are the over-
arching kind of data to be considered. As microeconomics textbooks put it,
"cardinal utility [functions are not] needed to describe choice behavior" (Var-
ian, 2005, p. 58), and if they nonetheless sometimes occur, they are "simply
convenient choices for a utility representation" (Mas-Colell, Whinston and
Green, p. 50). A pivotal claim, which is generally left implicit, underlies
these familiar statements: if choices are taken to constitute the empirical ba-
sis of economics, then cardinal utility loses its principled justifications. Had
today’s neoclassical economists not adhered to this claim, they would have
felt free to rely mainly or exclusively on choice data, and nonetheless leave
more scope to cardinal utility than just what convenience reasons permit.
However, by the current views, this sounds like an impossible theoretical
combination.
A homage to Patrick Suppes provides a good occasion to examine the
claim we have singled out.1 In the post-war years, Suppes contributed to giv-
ing the nascent discipline of decision theory its operating standards, a collec-
tive undertaking in which many other prominent scholars were involved, were
they among his close collaborators, like Luce, or more loosely connected with
him, like Marschak, Savage, and other followers of von Neumann and Mor-
genstern. All these writers assigned to decision theory the task of proving
representation theorems, i.e., theorems clarifying the equivalences holding be-
tween relational statements, typically interpreted as preference statements,
and numerical statements, typically interpreted as utility statements, and
all of them identified this proving task with an application of the axiomatic
method as could be encountered elsewhere in logic, mathematics, and sci-
ence.2 In this brilliant group of contributors, Suppes can be noted for two
significant features. For one thing, he was generally concerned with the prob-
lem of measuring quantities, and as such conceived of the axiomatic exercise
as a way to establish specific forms of measurement. In his quest for the most
precise forms, he was led to emphasize cardinal representations as a suitable
objective for his theorems. For another thing, being an empiricist philosopher
and scientist, he took choices to be the privileged, if not unique, source of
data the axiomatic exercise should pay attention to. In effect, without saying
so much, Suppes was running against the ordinalist tide of neoclassical eco-
1To our knowledge, the present paper and Moscati’s (2016b) are the first to discuss
Suppes’ utility theory in any detail. Previous homages have emphasized his measurement
theory and probability theory, and thus touched on our topic only indirectly (Luce, 1979,
and Rosenkrantz, 1979).
2Mongin (2003) has questioned this identification of the axiomatic method with repre-
sentation theorems. We will however take it for granted here.
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nomics. We offer this not as a historical statement, but as a reinterpretation
of his work, since he was neither initially trained nor primarily interested
in economics as such (see his enlightening 1979 "Self-Profile", from which
economics is almost absent).
In the first part of the paper, we give more flesh to the ordinalist tenets
sketched at the beginning of this introduction; once again, we propose a
conceptual reconstruction, and leave for others the full history of the mat-
ter. What we mean is to set a clear negative benchmark against which
fruitful connections between choice and cardinal utility can be discussed. In
the second part, we single out some of Suppes’ contributions to the theory
of cardinal representations, pertaining, respectively, to (i) choice under un-
certainty, (ii) stochastic choice, and (iii) choice under certainty. The third
part elaborates on the conflict between these contributions and the ordinalist
tenets of the first part. We highlight Suppes’ suggestions on (iii), which in
our view contains valuable advances. Extracting a general take-away message
from his work, we end up cautiously defending the possibility of choice-based
cardinal utility representations.
2 Ordinalism and its dissenters
Any discussion of the ordinalist tenets should begin with the celebrated dis-
covery made by neoclassical writers at the dawn of the 20th century. To
recover the essentials of demand theory, it proved unnecessary to endow the
individual consumer with a "numerical" or "measurable" utility function
over the set of commodity baskets. A utility function that merely indicates
the consumer’s preference ordering over these baskets proves sufficient to
deliver what can be salvaged from the old law of demand and related propo-
sitions. Before this major discovery, neoclassicals had developed demand the-
ory from the law of decreasing marginal utilities or other assumptions that
can be stated only if the utility function makes definite numerical sense. The
standard account singles out Pareto (1909) for replacing this thick appara-
tus by a thinner one, and his followers like Slutsky (1915), Hicks and Allen
(1934), and Hicks (1939) for bringing this replacement programme to com-
pletion. In this revised form of neoclassicism, utility functions would have
to be ordinal, in the sense of being unique up to any increasing transforma-
tion. Henceforth, when we write that a utility function is "ordinal", we refer
to this definition. It appears to have stabilized before than the definition
of a cardinal utility function did. Even relatively late in the 20th century,
neoclassical writers often adopted different words and different ideas to cap-
ture the more-than-ordinal features of a utility function. They said not only
"cardinal", but also "numerical", "measurable" and "quantitative", being
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quite vague - and no doubt disagreeing between themselves - on the kind of
mathematical uniqueness they had in view for the utility function.3
As Hicks (1939, p. 18) writes, "we have now to inquire whether a full
theory of consumer’s demand (...) cannot be built up from the assumption
of a scale of preference. In constructing such a theory it will be necessary
every time to reject any concept which is at all dependent on quantitative
utility, so that it cannot be derived from the indifference map alone". Beside
testifying to the vagueness of ideas concerning "quantitative utility", this
comment is instructive in the following way: while Hicks means his explica-
tion to restrict the utility concept, it also turns out to restrict the preference
concept. Preference is taken here to be a mere disposition to rank the objects
of interest (or to classify them as being indifferent, which we include in our
notion of a ranking). As Hicks goes on, "we start off from the indifference
map alone; nothing more can be allowed". Among other things, this implies
that unlike in some earlier approaches, there will be no room in the new
theory for comparisons of the type "i prefers more intensely hot chocolate to
coffee, than he prefers tea to herbal tea". Such comparisons are undefined
because they do something else than ranking options. Samuelson’s Founda-
tions (1947) exemplifies the glide, which we emphasize here, from the claim
that utility is exclusively ordinal to the claim that preference also is.4 The
Paretians never made this claim explicitly, so it remains unclear whether
they would have defended it as a semantic truth about the word "prefer-
ence", or as a technical restriction, which would be imposed for theoretical
or other strategic purposes.
In whichever interpretation one takes, this slimmering of the preference
concept was linked to a novel emphasis on choices as the appropriate basis
for demand theory. In the Manual, Pareto himself had promoted his ordinal
utility analysis by arguing not only that it was logically sufficient for demand
theory, but also that it made this theory more empirical, hence - in his
positivistic conception - more scientific. Allegedly, this upgrading of the
theory followed because the consumers’ choices were the new primitives (see,
e.g., 1909, III, 36bis). To reconcile Pareto’s claim on choices with the one
made later by Hicks, to the effect that preferences are the primitives, one
must assume that the psychological data of preferences can be expressed
sufficiently well by the external facts of choice. One way or another, this
further reductive assumption underlay all the Paretians’ work even before
Samuelson, starting with his 1938 paper, gave it the famous twist of "revealed
preference". Without elaborating here on individual positions, we wish to
emphasize that all Paretians supposed a close affinity between preferences
and choices, and this could only reinforce their slim conception of preferences.
3See Moscati’s (2013a and b, and 2016a) thorough account of how the cardinal versus
ordinal distinction stabilized in economics and decision theory.
4The Foundations uses "ordinal utility" and "ordinal preference" interchangeably, and
the index of the book refers to both expressions in a single entry (labelled after the latter).
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Indeed, to choose among options is to select some and leave others aside; from
barely observing this activity, it seems easy to infer a preference understood
as a ranking of options, and impossible to infer anything like a preference
intensity.
Our detour by demand theory can be excused by the historical fact that it
defined a benchmark for the analysis of economic decision-making in general.
This benchmark is what we are interested in here. We call it ordinalism and
summarize it by three reductive tenets: 1) utility functions are merely a
formal representation of preferences, 2) preferences are merely a disposition
to order the possible options, 3) choices merely inform the observer on how
preferences order options. We take 2) as denying that a subject compares
preference differences in the same structured way as he does preference levels
- in other words, as denying that the relation "I prefer more w to x than I do
y to z" defines an ordering. If 2) holds, 3) automatically does, but if 2) does
not hold, 3) may or may not hold. That is, if preferences have more than
the ordering-of-options property, it may or may not be the case that choices
inform the observer on this extra content. The possibility of either accepting
or rejecting 3) when one rejects 2) is essential to our reconstruction.
It follows from 1) and 2) together that utility functions can only be ordi-
nal. A more traditional account of ordinalist ideas would have extracted this
last claim and commented on it as follows: utility functions can only be ordi-
nal because they merely represent preferences. We object to this account on
the ground that it takes for granted the ordinalist conception of preferences
as being mere rankings, and thus gives the false impression that the ordinal
property of utility functions directly follows from their representational prop-
erty. This virtually reduces ordinalism to claim 1) as if there were nothing
more to ordinalism. By making the conception of preferences the object of
a separate commitment, we make it clear that two separate claims underlie
the uniqueness property of utility functions. Thus, our framework allows for
the logical possibility that a utility function be merely representational and
nonetheless represent preference differences, satisfying 1) but violating 2),
and this will indeed be the conception we attribute to Suppes. A different
objection to the more standard accounts, we think that ordinalism should
be discussed not only in terms of the preference, but also in terms of the
choice concept, although one must be careful here not to confuse ordinalism
with the revealed preference methodology (the latter being only a particular
development of the former).
The present account can be compared with Mongin and d’Aspremont’s
briefer comments (1998, p. 385-386), which emphasize 2) as a separate claim,
and the addition made by Bruni and Guala (2001, p. 24). The last authors
rightly emphasize that ordinalists limited the role of psychological assump-
tions in economics. This feature actually derives from the present list as
follows: claim 1) excludes that utility has a psychological basis in the psy-
chological feeling of subjective satisfaction (as in most classical and early
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neoclassical views), claim 2) excludes part of the psychological content one
may associate with the concept of preference, and claim 3) minimizes the
psychological content of choice information.5
To further illustrate the logical content of the three tenets, and also
to prepare the upcoming comparison with Suppes, we consider a historical
departure from 2) that predated his work and to some extent influenced it. In
an allusive passage of the Manual (1909, IV, §32), Pareto had claimed that,
when faced with four commodity baskets w, x, y, z, the consumer can know
whether he is more satisfied passing from x to w, or passing from z to y.
This is a striking early occurrence of the claim that comparisons can be made
not only between levels of satisfaction, but also between differences in these
levels. However, as could be expected from the founder of ordinalism, Pareto
had considered such comparisons only to exclude them; for him, they lacked
sufficient "precision" to be subjected to a scientific inquiry. But Lange (1934)
spotted the curious passage and tried to develop it in a positive direction. He
claimed that a subject comparing Paretian "transitions" could be endowed
with a "cardinal" utility function. Lange’s sketch of proof was unsound,
as others - prominently the mathematician Alt (1936-1971) - were soon to
demonstrate. But he had launched a line of research that implicitly rejected
the ordinalist claim 2). Lange’s analysis unfolded at the level of utility
representations alone, and thus remained equivocal, but Alt made a step
towards the rejection of 2) by introducing a quaternary ordering on the
options, i.e., an ordering that compares pairs of options (w, x) and (y, z).
Putting axioms on this new primitive term, he obtained a utility function
on the options with a relevant uniqueness property, thus proving one of the
first representation theorems ever, and more specifically opening the way to
Suppes’ work along the same line. To the extent that Alt’s ordering can be
interpreted as a preference ordering, he can be said to have opposed 2) and
thus shaken ordinalism at the peak of its theoretical success.
Without mentioning Pareto’s passage, and probably without being aware
of it, Frisch (1926, 1932) had already formalized comparisons of "displace-
ments" in the commodity space by a quaternary relation. However, this is
a formalization without a proper axiomatization, and in point of fact, only
a brief detour in two pieces that are primarily concerned with the empirical
measurement of marginal utility. We mention Frisch nonetheless because
Suppes refers to Frisch, though not to Alt, whose more significant contribu-
tion became recognized only belatedly.6
5On a different score, we do not need to extend our notion of "ordinalism" to the
collective form prevailing in social choice theory and social ethics. The word has been
used there quite extensively, still assuming 2) without saying, to deny that interpersonal
comparisons of utility are possible (see, e.g., Arrow, 1973, p. 253).
6On the distinction between a formalization and an axiomatization, see Mongin (2003).
Chipman (1971, p. 327-329) confirms Alt’s precedence in axiomatizing cardinal utility
(without the word "cardinal") for the first time. Moscati (2013a) examines how ideas of
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The programme initiated by Lange leaves two ordinalist tenets in place.
Consistently with 1), it takes utility to have no meaning per se, but only to
serve as a representation device, and consistently with 3), it limits choices
to providing basic ranking information. This last point calls for more detail.
Lange and followers tended to take introspection to be the single source of the
quaternary comparisons, and we interpret this restrictive position as being
dictated by continuing adherence to 3). A comment that Allen published
on Lange’s work makes this connection of ideas entirely explicit: "It has
been suggested that a second basic assumption can be added to the one al-
ready made [on the existence of a preference ranking of alternatives]. This
assumption refers to changes in the "intensity" of the preferences expressed
by the individual. It implies, in short, that the individual can distinguish
increments of preference and that he can order these increments in the same
way as the preferences themselves. Here we are dealing with something quite
new. The assumption cannot be expressed in terms of the individual’s acts of
choice; it can only be supported by introspection into one’s own experience or
by questioning others about their experiences" (1935, p. 155, our emphasis).
Notice that Allen’s lines also testify to the fact that Lange’s readers thought
of quaternary comparisons as being preference comparisons. Once a classic,
Allen’s (1956, p. 669-676) text on mathematical economics discusses "ordi-
nal" versus "measurable" utility along the same lines as his briefer comment
on Lange.
A different argument on ordinalism became available when von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1947, Appendix), and more clearly their followers, con-
nected the time-honoured expected utility (EU) formula with a preference
ordering over lotteries. This collective work, which Suppes witnessed when
it was still in progress, converged to the classic theorem stating that, given
relevant axiomatic conditions, the ordering has a representation in terms of
this EU formula. The uniqueness clause of the theorem seemed to endow the
utility function in this formula with a numerical ("measurable") property,
and this raised puzzlement among post-war economists, who, by then, had
been heavily exposed to ordinalist ideas. An intricate and profuse discussion
resulted among them. Some claimed that von Neumann and Morgenstern
(VNM) had rehabilitated the "cardinal utility" of the classical and early
neoclassicals, others, that this was not the case but they had nonetheless
obtained a "cardinal utility" function of their own, and still others, that
neither was the case and that their EU representation was in fact ordinal.
Although this would contextualize Suppes’ work more fully, it goes beyond
the scope of this paper to review the postwar debate on "the cardinal utility
which is ordinal", to use Baumol’s (1958) striking words, and we refer the
reader to the existing historical work in Fishburn (1989) and Moscati (2013a,
2016a). But we will briefly indicate the two key technical factors of this de-
comparing "transitions" spread out among economists.
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bate, which respectively concern the uniqueness property of the VNM utility
function and its ability to induce a measurement of preference differences.
Let us then take a closer look at the VNM representation theorem. Its
conclusion actually decomposes into an existence and a uniqueness part. Ac-
cording to the former, there exists a utility function u on the final outcomes
X such that the preference ordering of two lotteries P and Q coincides with
the comparison made between the expected utility values EPu and EQu of
these two lotteries. Formally, if one denotes by R the primitive weak prefer-
ence ordering:
PRQ if and only if EPu   EQu.
According to the latter, uniqueness part, the function u is unique up to a
positive affine transformation (PAT)7 in this representation. Formally, if u0
is another utility function on X, the following equivalence holds:
PRQ if and only if EPu0   EQu0
if and only if u0 is a PAT of u.
A simple argument shows that the italicized clause in this representation
cannot be removed. Since the VNM axiomatization assumes no more than a
preference ordering on lotteries, it follows that the EPu representation is in
fact ordinal, i.e., unique up to any increasing transformation '. For instance,
(EPu)2 or exp(EPu) are as admissible representations of the preferences over
lotteries as is EPu. This observation readily entails that there is no way of
reinforcing the uniqueness conclusion for u. For suppose that u were unique
to PAT unrestrictedly; then the representation EPu would be unique up to
PAT, and not up to any increasing transformation as was just said.
This discussion suggests introducing two notions of a cardinal utility
function for the remainder of the paper. Let us say that a utility function on
some set of options is absolutely cardinal if it is unique up to PAT, and that
it is relatively cardinal if it is unique up to PAT for a given format of repre-
sentation, such as the EU format here. We will see that this contrast applies
broadly. As far as VNM theory is concerned, a good deal of the postwar
debate can be explained by the fact that many protagonists missed the con-
trast entirely. Those who claimed that VNM had rehabilitated the "cardinal
utility" of the classical and early neoclassicals were off the mark, since they
ignored the new feature of VNM utility being obtained by a representation
theorem, but even those who claimed that VNM had obtained a "cardinal
utility" function of their own were not always correct, since some wrongly
believed that the u of the representation theorem was absolutely cardinal.
And those who claimed that this u was ordinal missed the important point
that a relatively cardinal utility obeys a stronger uniqueness restriction than
an arbitrary ordinal utility function.
7A positive affine transformation is of the form f(x) = ax+ b, with a > 0.
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The other key factor of the controversy has to do with the following argu-
ment, which was often discussed in the controversy (see a classic occurrence
in Luce and Raiffa, 1957, p. 31-34). Once the EU representation is obtained
from the existence conclusion of the VNM theorem, a utility difference for-
malism becomes readily available. Take two equiprobable lotteries between
w and x, and between y and z, respectively, and suppose that the preference
ordering puts the first strictly above the second. Then,
1
2
u(w) +
1
2
u(z) >
1
2
u(y) +
1
2
u(x),
which is trivially equivalent to:
u(w)  u(x) > u(y)  u(z).
Many participants to the debate took the comparisons of utility differences
thus obtained to represent corresponding preference differences; in the par-
ticular instance, they would have concluded that the subject prefers w to
x more than he prefers y to z. This understanding of VNM utility differ-
ences points towards the alternative definition of a cardinal utility function
as being one that can represent not only preference levels, but also pref-
erence differences, and this alternative definition was indeed present in the
debate, while being unclearly related to the formal definitions of the previous
paragraph. This compounded the confusion already created by the poor un-
derstanding of the formal definitions. We refrain from saying more on VNM
utility differences at the present stage, since this issue will come out again
when we discuss Suppes in section 4.
As a summary on the VNM theorem, we compare it with the three ordi-
nalist tenets. It gives a purely representational sense to the EU formula, thus
supporting 1). Whether it also supports 2) is a complex issue, depending on
how one views the utility difference argument of last paragraph. If one re-
jects 2) on the ground that VNM utility can measure preference differences,
it seems obvious to reject 3), since choices among lotteries, in the plain sense
of what counts as a choice, become a source of information on preference
differences. The position we will attribute to Suppes concerning EU repre-
sentations (more generally than the VNM representation) will consist of this
twin rejection of 2) and 3). We now move to a description (section 3) and
an assessment (section 4) of his contributions.
3 Suppes on utility differences
Suppes’ decision-theoretic contributions respond to a unifying concern for
scientific measurement. In a sequel of papers and books that culminated with
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the famous series of The Foundations of Measurement (starting in 1971),
coauthored with Krantz, Luce, and Tversky, he investigated various forms
of measurement of empirical properties, and fitted them in a unified mathe-
matical framework that permitted defining and comparing them rigorously.
When he tackled decision-theoretic issues in separate pieces of research, he
always emphasized that they entered the measurement framework as partic-
ular cases, and thus illustrated its heuristic fecundity.
This approach has some noticeable consequences. First of all, unlike
many positivist philosophers and scientists, Suppes does not draw a sharp
line between physical and psychological properties. What matters to him is
whether or not they are empirical properties, and in case they are, what
kind of measurement they are amenable to. With this open mind, when
he discusses decision-theoretic issues, he does not discard introspection as
a possible source of information and contents himself with the claim that
choices are a better source. As one of his leading papers goes, "many areas
of economic and modern statistical theory do not warrant a behavioristic
analysis of utility. In these domains there seems little reason to be ashamed
of direct appeals to introspection" (Suppes and Winet, 1955, p. 261). In
the same vein, Luce and Suppes (1965, p. 273) write that introspection has
been "unduly depreciated in some of the modern literature on choice behav-
ior". Suppes’ position is not fully explicit, but it seems to rely on the view
that introspection provides empirical data no less than choices, and if choice
data are altogether preferable, this is only because they support more secure
forms of measurement.8
Second, Suppes practices the method of representation theorems to clar-
ify measurement possibilities. In decision theory, this leads him to be critical
of the VNM and Savage axiom systems, which he complains assume unre-
alistically large sets of options and preferences comparisons. His favourite
manner involves taking a finite set of options and a subclass of the logically
possible comparisons, even if this economy must be achieved at the expense of
the elegance and generality of the representation theorems. When he cannot
impose finiteness, he tries at least to avoid topological or measure-theoretic
assumptions on the set of options; typically, instead of such assumptions, he
introduces "solvability conditions" among his axioms.
Third, the representation theorems that Suppes wishes for decision the-
ory should deliver a utility difference representation (this will automatically
entail a utility level representation as a particular case). This search for a
precise form of utility function does not reflect a predetermined conception
of preference and choice but rather a scientific hope: to count as an empirical
science, decision theory must be able at least sometimes to reach this stage of
8Whether or not this position conflicts with behaviourism becomes a terminological
issue. In his self-retrospective, Suppes claims to adhere to a form of "methodological
behaviorism (...) wholly compatible with mentalistic concepts" (1979, p. 34).
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measurement, and carefully designing the observational or experimental de-
sign could perhaps bring about this result. With these general comments in
place, we now sketch Suppes’ contributions, using his own terms as much as
possible. We will not emphasize the uniqueness problem of utility represen-
tations in the present section. This, along with other substantial comments,
will be reserved for section 4.
As Suppes and Winet (1955, p. 259) put at the outset, they are concerned
with "reviving the notion of utility differences" and believe they can do so
by proving representations theorems that apply to several choice contexts
at once. The authors mentioned choice under uncertainty and choice under
certainty, and with the benefit of hindsight, we can add stochastic choice,
which attracted Suppes’ later interest. Still following Suppes and Winet, we
distinguish two steps in this revival programme. Given a domain X and a
quaternary relation < defined onX, the first, mathematical step is to subject
the relational statements wx < yz to axiomatic conditions that will entail a
representation in terms of utility differences, namely,
(*) wx < yz if and only if u(w)  u(x)   u(y)  u(z),
for some u on X with a relevant uniqueness property. For this statement of
the mathematical problem, Suppes and Winet are indebted to the authors
discussed in last section - they cite both Frisch and Lange, although not Alt,
who was not yet known. The second, this time informal step, is to check
that the domain X and the axiomatic conditions on < are appropriate, given
the interpretations for < provided by the above contexts. At this semantic
level, Suppes and Winet depart from Frisch, Lange and Alt, since these
predecessors had considered only one context, i.e., choice under certainty.
A preliminary comment is in order. The paper with Winet actually sets
out to axiomatize an absolute difference representation, i.e.,
(**) wx < yz if and only if |u(w)  u(x)|   |u(y)  u(z)|.
It is however the algebraic difference representation (*) that Suppes’ revival
programme is concerned with. We find it slightly embarrassing that the same
paper contains both the clearest statement of this programme and an un-
representative implementation of it. We will leave aside (**) until the end
of section 4, where we argue in effect that Suppes should have axiomatized
(*) rather then (**).
(i) Choice under uncertainty. This choice context is only briefly men-
tioned in the paper with Winet, but Suppes will return to it thoroughly later.
If probabilities were given, Suppes would simply repeat the argument dis-
cussed in last section, and take wx < yz to hold if the subject weakly prefers
an equiprobable lottery on w and z to another equiprobable lottery on y
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and x. Assuming the VNM theorem to hold, this would deliver the following
equivalence:
wx < yz if and only if 1
2
u(w) +
1
2
u(z)   1
2
u(y) +
1
2
u(x),
However, Suppes argues that the risk approach makes empirical sense only if
"psychological probabilities are identical with the (...) objective" ones, a very
dubious assumption in his view.9 In a deep and novel insight at this formative
stage of decision theory, Suppes realizes that subjective probabilities are
more fundamental than lotteries and VNM theory is in fact incomplete,
since it takes probabilities as given only by mathematical convention. In
today’s textbook terminology, Suppes subordinates the theory of risk to that
of uncertainty. This is also Savage’s (1954) insight and we will leave it for
historians to explain what the respective influences were.
Moving now to the more appropriate uncertainty context, we denote by
wA⇤z (resp. yA⇤x) the prospect of w (resp. y) obtaining if A⇤ occurs and
z (resp. x) obtaining otherwise. According to Suppes’ definition, wx < yz
holds if the subject prefers wA⇤z to yA⇤x, with the event A⇤ being such that
for all x0, y0, x0A⇤y0 ⇠ y0A⇤x0. In the first sketch ever made of an axiomatiza-
tion of subjective probabilities, Ramsey (1926, in 1931, p. 177) had singled
out events like A⇤, calling them "ethically neutral" (a strange denomination);
in words, A⇤ is such that a subject faced with two consequences x0 and y0 is
equally willing to see x0 realized on A⇤ and y0 on its complementary, or to see
y0 realized on A⇤ and x0 on its complementary. When Ramsey’s axiomatic
exercise is properly completed, a subjective expected utility (SEU) represen-
tation emerges and the ethically neutral event A⇤ receives probability 1/2, so
that the prospects wA⇤z and yA⇤x can occupy the role of the two equiprob-
able lotteries of VNM theory, and the equivalence above holds, though with
a more satisfactory interpretation of the equal probability values. A utility
difference representation as in (*) follows from the equivalence. Two papers
by Davidson and Suppes (1956) and Suppes (1956) implement the strategy
of this paragraph, while for the first time bringing Ramsey’s ideas to the
stage of sharp representation theorems.10
We have stressed that Suppes’ axiomatic method embodies strong em-
pirical concerns, and this is reflected in Davidson and Suppes (1956) by two
departures from Ramsey’s implicitly unrestricted framework.11 The set X of
consequences is taken to be finite, and the axioms are so devised that once
the SEU representation obtains, the consequences have equally spaced utility
9This quote is from Davidson and Suppes (1956, p. 159). A similar passage can be
found in Suppes and Winet (1955, p. 259).
10See also Bradley’s (2004) reconstruction of Ramsey in fully contemporary style.
11By a curious contrast, Suppes (1956) defines the quaternary relation < on a set even
larger than Ramsey’s, i.e., the set of probability mixtures of prospects. As Suppes is well
aware of, this contravenes to his principle of taking small domains for < .
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values and combine in the EU formula with only a finite number of subjective
probability values. Moreover, the set of two-consequence prospects wA⇤z is
limited to genuinely uncertain ones, i.e., it excludes wA⇤w (the certainty of
w), which is justified by another empirical concern. Davidson and Suppes
worry that if sure prospects enter the comparisons, they may introduce the
distorting influence of what they call the "utility of gambling".12 Lastly,
unlike Ramsey, Davidson and Suppes restrict their axioms to the indiffer-
ence part of the preference ordering on prospects, i.e., in statements of the
form wAz ⇠ yAx, as against those representing the preference ordering in
general, wAz < yAx. In view of all these restrictions, their representation
theorem can only be much weaker than those of Ramsey and (blurring the
distinction between risk and uncertainty) VNM, but they fully endorse this
implication: "the relative weakness of the present theory is the price to be
paid for making it more behavioristic" (1956, p. 26).
In Suppes’ mind, an experimental stage had to follow these axiomatic
preliminaries, and it took place in a separate work coauthored with an ex-
perimental psychologist (Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel, 1957). Suppes and
his collaborators tried there to identify an event that would be "ethically
neutral" across the pool of subjects. This proved to be more challenging
than expected, because the subjects appeared to express preferences over the
events that a fair coin lands heads rather tails, or that a fair dice rolls to an
odd number rather than an even one. The experimenters adopted a dice with
either of two meaningless syllables, "ZEJ" and "ZOJ", engraved on each of
the six sides, and thus eventually generated what appeared to them to be
an "ethically neutral" event A⇤. From there, they proceeded to elicit utility
differences by taking consequences to be small amounts of money (ranging
over cents), both positive and negative. Whenever possible, utility functions
were derived from these data. In principle, an empirical verdict on SEU
theory should have ensued, but the data were in fact inconclusive, as Suppes
came later to recognize.13 When revisiting these experimental efforts, Luce
(1979, p. 102) will also have to conclude that, careful as they were, "they
did not lead to a clear decision as to the adequacy of the expected-utility
property".
(ii) Stochastic choice. For good historical reasons, this choice context
was not mentioned in Suppes and Winet, but once stochastic choice theory
took off, Suppes developed an interest in the utility difference representations
this theory delivers, so we have included it into his revival programme. (See
the supporting comment in Suppes and Zinnes, 1963, p. 38.) Here wx < yz
12The utility of gambling (which Suppes understands somewhat differently from VNM)
is the topic of Royden, Suppes, and Walsh (1959).
13One problem was that the experimental model allowed for an "error" in the subject’s
responses, and this turned out also to permit violations of the SEU axioms. Suppes and
Walsh (1959) tried to circumvent the problem, but their results were not clear-cut either.
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holds in terms of a comparison between the subject’s choice probabilities.
Formally,
wx < yz if and only if p(w, x)   p(y, z),
where p(w, x) and p(y, z) are the probabilities that the subject chooses w
over x and that he chooses y over z, given the respective menus of options
{w, x} , {y, z} ✓ X. Relevant axiomatizations of < ensure that there exists
a utility function u on X such that
p(w, x)   p(y, z) if and only if u(w)  u(x)   u(y)  u(z).
Thus, as Luce and Suppes (1965, p. 334) mention, stochastic choice theory
in axiomatic form provides another road to (*). Since the original papers
by Davidson and Marschak (1959) and Block and Marschak (1960), this
theory has received at least two possible interpretations. For both Suppes
and Luce, the probabilities are choice frequencies when the choice task is
repeated and the source of randomness lies in the choice itself, as against
its psychological determining factors (among which the preferences). The
alternative interpretation locates randomness in these determining factors
themselves.14
Suppes witnessed the birth of the stochastic choice literature and ob-
served its development carefully (the review in Luce and Suppes, 1965, sec-
tion 5, is still used as a reference today). He also contributed to it with
two novel representation theorems (Suppes, 1961). They were part of a
larger, now little-known project, the originality of which was that it did not
take choice probabilities as given, but derived them in a supposedly rigorous
"behavioristic" fashion. The probabilities were the asymptotic result of a
learning process, which consisted of the three stages of stimulus sampling,
response conditioning, and reinforcement. This work was also the occasion
of sketching a "dynamic theory of (...) the acquisition of a particular set of
beliefs or values", which could override the "static" character of standard
representation theorems (1961, p. 186).
(iii) Choice under certainty. This is the other choice context that
Suppes and Winet mention and it is the specific object of their axiomatic
work. They illustrate it by three concrete variants, each of which represents
a step towards experimentation. The first hinges on the subject’s willingness
to pay for exchanging options, and it is curiously reminiscent of the "money
pump argument" for the transitivity of preference that Davidson, McKinsey,
and Suppes (1955, p. 146) introduced in the same year. This takes wx < yz
to hold if the subject, when endowed with both x and z, is willing to pay at
least as much to replace x by w as he is to replace z by y.15 A closely related
14For surveys that emphasize this duality, see de Palma and Thisse (1987) and Fishburn
(1998).
15Rosenkrantz (1979, p. 117) interestingly connects this variant with the idea of "dollar
vote" in social choice theory.
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variant exploits the subject’s willingness to work, with wx < yz holding if
the subject, when endowed with both x and z, is ready to work at least as
much to replace x by w as he is to replace z by y. As Suppes and Winet
(1955, p. 260) observe, the common idea behind these two examples is that
a monotonic variation in some agreed on quantity permits measuring util-
ity differences, thus opening another road to (*). Without the word and
without the historical reference, the third variant leads us back to Paretian
"transitions", i.e., wx < yz holds if, when endowed with both x and z, the
subject is either more willing to exchange x for w than z for y, or indiffer-
ent between the two exchanges. By axiomatizing < appropriately, one gets
the utility difference representation (*), with u on X satisfying a relevant
uniqueness property. Because Suppes and Winet derived an absolute differ-
ence representation, proper axiomatizations of < conforming to the third
variant needed to await Suppes’ later work, e.g., in Krantz, Luce, Suppes
and Tversky (1971, p. 147; see also the restatement in Köbberling, 2006, p.
381).
Each of the suggested variants has its theoretical problems. As Luce and
Suppes (1965, p. 273-275) will recognize when revisiting them, the first two
resort to a quantity that does not belong to the initial set of options. One
may respond to this by redefining this set, but then the objection rebounds,
since the subject’s preference over the new options must be separable, and
this is a substantial assumption to make.16 That is, with options now defined
as (x,m), where m is, say, a quantity of money, the subject must rank the
m component always in the same way regardless of the value taken by the
x component. This assumption may or may not be appropriate, given the
objects represented by x. Now, the proposed scheme needs < also to be
continuous; otherwise the subject could not determine what money amount
m0 makes the option (y,m0) indifferent with (x,m), given two distinct x
and y. Continuity is a significant assumption to make when the options are
multidimensional.
The Paretian "transitions" variant can eschew the separability and conti-
nuity problems above, but raises other queries. We may discard the objection
that to assume that the subject initially has both x and z violates the princi-
ple that options should be alternatives, i.e., mutually exclusive objects, for it
is enough to redefine them as being pairs (x, z) and think of the comparisons
as being made on such pairs.17 More importantly, it is not said whether the
scheme applies unrestrictedly or only in those cases in which the subject ei-
ther prefers w to x or prefers y to z. In the latter interpretation, the subject
will always compare the status quo with a change for the better, and thus be
faced with a genuine choice problem, but only nonnegative utility differences
can be measured in this way. In the former interpretation, the subject will
16Fishburn (1970, chapter 6) restates the problem in this more sophisticated way.
17This objection appears in Fishburn (1970, chapter 6).
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also compare the status quo with changes for the worse, and this permits
measuring negative utility differences, but the meaning in terms of choices
is not so clear. Indeed, the subject must be forced to decide between the two
evils, and only an experimental context can create the conditions for a forced
exchange to take place, whereas choices in the other case could in principle
be observed non-experimentally. All in all, the information carried by such
a decision seems to be less secure than that carried by choices in the other
case.
Suppes and Winet (1955, p. 260) illustrate their use of "transitions" by
imagining a housewife faced with a pair of appliances, say a toaster and
a waxer, and then confronted with the "choice of trading the toaster for
waffle iron, or the waxer for the blender". From the corresponding passage,
we conclude that Suppes envisaged changes for the worse as well as for the
better.18
Suppes’ writings contains regrettably little on context (iii). The arti-
cle with Luce has the following comment: "Unfortunately, we know of no
experiments that have attempted to apply either of these methods to the
measurement of utility differences" (1965, p. 274). This in particular in-
dicates that he never set himself the task of experimenting with the three
concrete variants of (iii). Perhaps he found work along this line too novel
and difficult, perhaps he did not value it so much as he did work on (i) and
(ii), which connected better with his broader theoretical projects.
We now clarify the extent to which Suppes’ contributions conflict with or-
dinalism and try to decide whether they bring out cogent arguments against
it.
4 Suppes and ordinalism
Suppes claimed to be a philosopher and a social scientist, not an economist.
As such, he had no theoretical stake with debasing ordinalism, but he was
well aware that his approach to cardinal utility went against orthodox eco-
nomic theory. For instance, Luce and Suppes (1965, p. 273) write: "if we
speak of the utility difference, or the difference in preference, between pairs
of alternatives, then the classical objection of economists is that choices be-
tween alternatives do not yield behavioral evidence on these differences".
Suppes also knew the economics literature well enough to recognize dis-
senters like Frisch and Lange. The first task of this section is to strengthen
his allusive comments into an explicit position concerning ordinalism.
18We conclude this from the expression "due account being taken of the algebraic sign
of the difference" (Suppes and Winet, 1955, p. 260). This expression recurs in Luce and
Suppes (1965, p. 274).
16
Since Suppes promotes the method of representation theorems and thor-
oughly applies it to decision theory, all his work takes claim 1) of ordinalism
for granted. Claims 2) and 3), however, are potentially contentious between
him and this doctrine. The statements we have proposed for these claims an-
alytically exclude rejecting 3) while endorsing 2), so that there are only two
ways to contradict ordinalism, i.e., to reject 2) and 3) or to reject 2) alone.
It is not difficult to locate Suppes’ position on this logical map: he opposes
both 2) and 3), thus departing from the economists’ received doctrine more
dramatically than Lange and followers do. The last section has listed three
contexts for which he considered axiomatizing "utility differences", and re-
viewing them, we find that he conceived of the primitive relation wx < yz in
terms of choices for all three contexts, and in terms of preference differences
for at least contexts (i) and (iii). Here is some textual evidence for this
conclusion. Suppes performed choice experiments on (i), and although he
did nothing of the kind for (iii), he made nonetheless clear a choice inter-
pretation for wx < yz also for this context (notice the word "choice" in the
housewife passage of last section). Obviously he had a choice interpretation
for (ii). He made it very clear that he also supported a preference difference
interpretation concerning (i): "In the intended interpretation, wx < yz if
and only the difference in preference between w and x is not greater than the
difference in preference between y and z" (Davidson and Suppes, 1956, p.
262), or concerning both (i) and (iii): "we assume that a prior satisfactory
analysis of preference (as opposed to preference difference) has already been
given" (Suppes and Winet, 1955, p. 260). What is not so clear is what he
thougt of the preference difference interpretation for context (ii).19 How-
ever, the ease with which he moved from the language of choice to that of
preference differences - see, e.g., the quote from Luce and Suppes in the last
paragraph - suggests that he viewed the former, in many circumstances, as
providing good information on the latter. This is sufficient evidence to lo-
cate him beyond the stage where Lange and followers had left the rejection
of ordinalism. Although by no means hostile to introspection, Suppes clearly
thought that it was possible, and it would be more secure, to document
preference differences in terms of choices.20
The second, more difficult task of this section is to evaluate the position
we thus attribute to Suppes. We first review the three contexts again, focus-
ing on the primitive relations that enter the representation theorems proved
for them by Suppes and related writers, and we ask two critical questions
concerning these relations. Do they receive a genuine choice interpretation
19See Luce and Suppes’ (1965, p. 334) convoluted comment on two forms of "strength of
preference" in context (ii). This is part of a passage where they present a counterexample
by Savage, which we are going to discuss.
20When commenting on Lange, Alt (1936, in 1971, p. 425) and Zeuthen (1937, p. 237)
had passingly contemplated the possibility of collecting choice evidence on preference
differences.
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from these contexts? And if a relation receives a genuine choice interpreta-
tion from a context, does it also receive from it a genuine interpretation in
terms of preference differences?
(i) Choice under uncertainty. For definiteness, we focus our discus-
sion on Davidson and Suppes’ (1956) axiom system. As we have seen, these
authors’ primitive is only an indifference relation, and it is taken to hold only
for two-consequence prospects, wAz ⇠ yAx, for any event A. Their choice
interpretation for such a restricted primitive raises two questions. First, the
more common procedures to reveal an indifference relation from choices ap-
proximate it by supposing that strict preferences exist, and these are not part
of the primitives. We may ignore this problem as if it were purely technical.
It seems indeed possible to start more generally from wAz < yAx and re-
state Davidson and Suppes’ axiom system accordingly; this would just liken
it to Ramsey’s initial sketch. Now comes the problem that "ethically neu-
tral" events are elusive to the observer: a subject might have a well-defined
ordering of prospects wAz < yAx, without ever exhibiting the desired com-
parison, i.e., x0A⇤y0 ⇠ y 0A⇤x0 for some A⇤, x0, y0. If this happens, Ramsey’s
hope of deriving subjective probabilities from choices among prospects col-
lapses entirely. We may, however, take Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel’s word
that this existence problem can be overcome in practice. In sum, with rel-
evant qualifications, we can agree that Davidson and Suppes’ axioms are
concerned with genuine choices and these adduce sufficient information for
utility differences to be ascertainable from them.
We now attack the remaining question of whether these utility differ-
ences represent preference differences. As Davidson and Suppes preserve the
essentials of the equiprobability argument used in the VNM framework, we
can at the same time take a position on their work and this famous piece of
decision theory. The trivial equivalence:
1
2
u(w) +
1
2
u(z)   1
2
u(y) +
1
2
u(x)() u(w)  u(x)   u(y)  u(z).
cannot by itself guarantee that the utility differences on the right side have
any meaning, let alone the desired meaning of representing preference differ-
ences. The meaning criterion for a property of a utility representation lies
exclusively in the interpretation given to the axioms that are used to derive
this representation, but neither the VNM axioms nor the more sophisticated
Davidson-Suppes axioms can be interpreted in terms of preference differ-
ences. These axioms can receive a sense in terms of risk attitudes - e.g., they
make these attitudes independent of the lottery or the state of the world
considered - and some meaning can perhaps be found to utility differences
by following this semantic line, but it is clearly distinct from the meaning
of interest here. This straightforward, but powerful argument was made
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by Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 31-34) when the controversy was raging over
VNM utility.21 It can be refined by adding that, if utility difference could
be interpreted in terms of preference differences, on top of their natural in-
terpretation in terms of risk attitudes, this could only result from adding
axiomatic material. The supplementary axioms can be spelled out in all
technical detail.22 Of course, the next question will be whether such a rein-
forcement is purely formal or carries a plausible semantics with it. Whichever
the final answer, the fact remains that, in the absence of the supplementary
axioms, only the interpretation in terms of risk attitudes can be considered.
Davidson and Suppes do not even consider this objection. They may be
excused on the ground that they are primarily trying to extract probabili-
ties, and they identify utility values only with this purpose. Utility values
that relate only to risk attitudes, not to preference differences, can fit such
a strategy. But it is more difficult to explain Suppes’ inclusion of context
(i) along with context (iii) into one and the same research programme on
utility differences. And elsewhere in his work, he made some definitely un-
guarded claims regarding the ability of u to measure preference differences.
For instance, Davidson, McKinsey, and Suppes (1955, p. 157) bluntly write
that axiom systems like the VNM one "suggest relative simple behavioristic
procedures for empirically testing degrees of preference".
To summarize the case for context (i), this delivers a genuine choice
interpretation, but lacking a suitable defence, no interpretation in terms of
preference differences.
(ii) Stochastic choice. There is no question that this context brings
out choice information, since the primitive term p(w, x) comes with the in-
terpretation of the frequency of a particular choice. The controversial part
is how to relate the stochastic data to preferences. What we have identified
as the major difficulty with (i) is still present here: preference differences
do not enter the axiom system, so that the claim that the derived u value
permits representing them is unwarranted. The conclusion just reached for
(i) holds equally well for (ii).
One may strengthen this dismissal by exploiting an intuitive argument
that Luce and Suppes (1965, p. 334-335) have impartially pointed out. In
private correspondence with Luce, Savage had claimed that one could find
three options x, y and z with the following properties: the subject wavers
between x and y, though slightly in favour of x, wavers between x and z,
though slightly in favour of z, but does not hesitate to take z when the
other option is y. If probabilities could be equated with utility differences,
a contradiction would result. Translating the choice probabilities into utility
differences, one would get that u(x)  u(y) is a very small positive number,
21Allen (1957, p. 674-675) makes the same point using numerical examples.
22See Bouyssou and Vansnick’s (1990) clear summary.
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u(x) u(z) is another very small positive number, and u(z) u(y) is a quite
large positive number. This is a contradiction since
u(z)  u(y) = u(z)  u(x) + u(x)  u(y).
In other words, utility differences must add up, whereas choice probabilities
are not expected always to do so. After a complex discussion, Luce and
Suppes acknowledge that they cannot accommodate the objection entirely
(see p. 337).23
One can question the link between stochastic choice and preference dif-
ferences by a more direct semantic argument. In general - barring the ex-
ceptional 0-1 case - stochastic choice data do not entail the existence of an
ordinal utility function. That a strongly unique u exists independently of any
ordinal representation is paradoxical from the perspective of utility theory.
In fact, stochastic choice theory has been developed for subjects who either
do not have preference orderings, or do have ones, but make implementations
errors and thus deviate from their preferences at the choice level. It would
be very strange to attribute an ordering of preference differences to subjects
with these characteristics.24
To summarize the case for context (ii), the choice interpretation is un-
problematic, but the interpretation in terms of preference differences fails,
and this time, we suggest, for deep semantic reasons, and not simply for lack
of a proper justification.
(iii) Choice under certainty. We begin by a technical move, i.e.,
the dismissal of the absolute difference representation (**) that Suppes and
Winet (1955) axiomatically derive. They need the formidable axiom (labelled
A5 in their paper):
xy < yx for all x, y 2 X.
In preference terms, this would entail that the subject is indifferent between
moving up or down the utility scale, which seems absurd. Some empirical
measurements fit the axiom and ensuing representation very well, for in-
stance those involving the distance concept, and it remains a mystery why
Suppes did not mention them in his paper instead of connecting his axiomatic
with a "revival" programme that is ostensibly concerned with preferences. A
possible explanation is that he was primarily interested in this programme,
but did not yet have the right theorem for his purpose. As we mentioned,
23Savage takes x to be a pony, y to be an ordinary bicycle, and z to be a sophisticated
bicycle. The subject, a boy, cannot make his mind between x and y, or between x and z,
but does not hesitate anymore when comparing z and y.
24We have followed Luce’s and Suppes’ usual view of choice probabilities. In the alterna-
tive conception, randomness takes place prior to the choice level, and is often understood
as having to do with what ordering the subject will implement in his choices. It is no
more plausible in this conception that utility differences capture preference differences.
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axiom systems for (*) appear only in his later work. The crucial axiom in
these systems is:
(A) wx < yz if and only if zy < xw for all x, y, z, w 2 X,
which is of course much weaker than Suppes and Winet’s A5.
Having thus cleared the ground, we discuss our two questions in terms
of comparisons of Paretian "transitions". We have left pending the problem
that these comparisons raise when it comes to interpreting them in terms
of choices. In one variant, the observer collects comparisons only when both
"transitions" are for the better, and in the other, he collects them in all cases.
Let us consider the more encompassing variant first. When the subject does
not spontaneously depart from the status quo, the observer will have to tell
him that he should do so, and force him if necessary. This is a forced choice
all right, but is it less of a choice for that? A purist who would complain
that the choice information is blurred by the intervention would have to
take a sceptical stand on experimental work in decision theory as a whole,
since the instructions that experimenters need to give to their subjects are
similarly verbal and authoritarian. They create artificial situations that are
only remotely related to the subjects’ own experiences, and the answers
given for these situations nonetheless count as being representative of the
subjects’ choices. To deny that would be to dismiss basic experiments, such as
Allais’ and Kahneman and Tversky’s, whose significance is well established in
decision theory. We do not see why an experiment on swapping objects, as in
the housewife example, would strike subjects as being stranger than standard
experiments on lotteries, which involve the possibly unfamiliar concept of a
numerical probability. The consistent purist will have to go as far as to claim
that only non-induced choices count, as is supposedly the case with market
observations. We interpret Lange’s and Allen’s claims regarding introspection
as reflecting this drastic stand, which neoclassical economist often endorsed
both before and after these writers. Here Suppes’ position as an external
observer of economics appears to be a clear advantage.
Another line of argument is available anyhow, which makes it less nec-
essary to discuss experimentation. For (*) to obtain, axiom (A) must hold,
and since it is needed anyhow, one may use it as well to convert the infor-
mation on positive differences into information on negative differences. That
is, instead of letting the subject decide between "transitions" for the worse,
one will apply (A) to the more natural comparison made for the better that
results from reversing the order of the "transitions". Notice that (A) is pow-
erful enough also to cover comparisons between a "transition" for the better
and a "transition" for the worse.25 A philosophical discussion may then
ensue to decide whether (A) makes sense only for a rational agent or as a
matter of definition; this discussion would be reminiscent of the classic one
25From (A), if wx < yy, then yy < xw, whence wx < xw by transitivity.
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concerning the transitivity of preference, which has been defended in both
ways.
We have these two principled ways of defending a choice interpretation
for the primitive relation wx < yz when context (iii) prevails, but we must
acknowledge the complication of motivating the choices in the course of an
experiment. Following the received methodology of experimental economics,
if Suppes’ housewife is to answer truthfully whether she chooses trading the
toaster for the waffle iron, or trading the waxer for the blender, she must
be materially motivated to do so. The purist of our previous discussion
may change tack and argue in this more pragmatic way. However, it is
unclear whether the motivation problem is worse here than it is in basic
choice experiments such as Allais’ or Kahneman and Tversky’s, and the
purist may have again to extend his critique farther than he means to.
We now move to the question of whether the relation wx < yz can be
interpreted in terms of preference differences. This is a priori unproblematic,
because the axiom systems are geared at this interpretation, unlike those
proposed for contexts (i) and (ii), but an a posteriori check may be desirable.
It would consist in selecting a system from Suppes’ late work, or even better
from a recent catalogue of such systems like the one Köbberling (2006) offers,
and checking that each axiom in turn can receive a plausible semantics in
terms of preference differences. We eschew this task here and just claim that
it can be carried out.
To summarize the case for context (iii), it appears to pass both inter-
pretative tests, unlike the others.
The rejection of both ordinalist tenets 2) and 3) seems to be warranted
at long last, but we must now explain what kind of utility functions will
come out of this rejection and the simultaneous acceptance of tenet 1). In
section 2, we have clarified the uniqueness of the VNM utility function u on
X by saying that it is only relatively cardinal. The same restriction holds
not only for the utility functions obtained by other representation theorems
for context (i), such as that of Davidson and Suppes, but also for the utility
functions obtained by the very different theorems proved for contexts (ii)
and (iii). Since the last context has emerged as the only one of relevance,
we consider it exclusively from now on.
Like the VNM representation theorem, those proved for (iii) have an
existence and a uniqueness conclusion. According to the former, there exists
a utility function u on X such that
wx < yz if and only if u(w)  u(x)   u(y)  u(z),
and according to the latter, u is unique to PAT in this utility difference rep-
resentation. This specific relative uniqueness conclusion actually depends on
having included relevant solvability assumptions into the axioms - Suppes’
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way - or making sufficiently strong domain assumptions - the more standard
contemporary way -, but we may gloss over this technicality, and just con-
centrate on the fact that the format restriction is inevitable, exactly as it
was in the VNM case.26
The previous equivalence can be transformed into
wx < yz if and only if '(u(w)  u(x))   '(u(y)  u(z)),
where ' is any increasing transform of u, and this states exactly what the
generic form of the representation of the quaternary relation is. We can
illustrate the consequences for the uniqueness of u by taking ' = exp, so
that
wx < yz if and only if exp(u(w)  u(x))   exp(u(y)  u(z)).
If we define u0 = expu, this equivalence becomes
wx < yz if and only if u
0(w)
u0(x)
  u
0(y)
u0(z)
,
and we have checked that, by deviating from the utility difference format,
one can find a utility function u0 on X that is not a PAT of u, but can
nonethless serve to represent the primitive relation. In brief, even with a
direct axiomatization of preference differences, the resulting utility function
on X can only be relatively cardinal.
Does this fact diminish our conclusion that a utility function can combine
the three attributes of being purely representational, representing preference
differences, and having a choice basis? We do not think so. There is no ana-
lytic connection between the property of representing preference differences
and of being cardinal absolutely rather than relatively, so that we can take
the fact in question as making the conclusion more precise instead of con-
tradicting it. It is true that from the point of view of measurement theory,
an absolutely cardinal utility function would be a more satisfactory result.
If it could be obtained by representation theorems in decision theory, some
measurements in this field would enjoy the respectable status of tempera-
ture measurement. There are occasional vacillations in Suppes’ and Luce’s
statements of the uniqueness of utility functions, and they suggest that they
might have been misled by such physical analogies.27 With the benefit of
26See Basu (1982) for the standard contemporary way of reaching the relative uniqueness
restriction. Note that a domain restriction is also embodied in VNM theory, as it postulates
a set of lotteries, which are highly structured objects.
27A somewhat gross example appears in the following passage: "the various systems
developed to represent the expected utility hypothesis end up with the result that utility is
measured on an interval scale" (Luce and Suppes, 1965, p. 284). A utility function defined
on an interval scale is absolutely cardinal. This is however a rare example; compare with
the entirely correct formulation in Davidson and Suppes (1956).
23
hindsight, one may doubt that decision theory will ever reach this higher
measurement stage, and the hope seems also forlorn in the related field of
psychophysics. For instance, Falmagne’s (2002) book on psychophysics di-
rectly defines a utility difference representation in terms of the generic form
'(u(w)  u(x)).
5 Conclusion
On the occasion of an homage to Patrick Suppes, we have revisited some
classic controversies of theoretical economics on ordinal and cardinal utility
functions. No doubt a full investigation of this contrast should involve one in
considering not only Suppes and his group of collaborators, but also Allais
(1994) and Harsanyi (1955), who developed different brands of ideas about
cardinal utility, and writers in the classical and early neoclassical tradition,
who did not think of utility functions as being obtained by representation
theorems. Despite these lacunas, we hope to have brought some conceptual
clarity to a still poorly understood debate. By identifying three distinctive
claims in ordinalism, which is not usually done, we have been able to contrast
Suppes’ choice-based cardinalism from Lange’s introspection-based form of
this doctrine, and by carefully attending to the theoretical and empirical
differences between the choice contexts in which Suppes’ cardinalism could
possibly be implemented, we have finally been able to retain one of his sug-
gestions.
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